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Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child Protection Law in BC
By Judith Mosoff, Isabel Grant, Susan B. Boyd, and Ruben Lindy*
This paper is concerned with how courts in British Columbia adjudicate applications by the state to remove children
permanently from their parents, usually their mothers. Overwhelmingly, these cases are about single mothers who
experience mental disability and addiction, domestic violence, and poverty. Indigenous women are overrepresented
in our sample. The intergenerational effects of the child protection system also are clear as many of the mothers in
our study were themselves raised in state care. The paper highlights the degree to which judges blame women for
the precarious circumstances in which they live, which are often a product of austerity measures adopted by states.
Courts describe these circumstances as being a function of poor “lifestyle choices”, thus obscuring the role of the
state in protecting women from violence, providing safe housing and supporting mothers and children with
disabilities. Particularly troubling is the finding that courts are appear to be more willing to sever the relationship
between mothers and their children where those children are themselves identified as having “special needs”.
Judges are quick to assume that a child will be “better off” in state care even in the face of evidence that the child
protection system in British Columbia has woefully failed both children and their mothers.
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Introduction
This paper is concerned with how British Columbia courts adjudicate applications by the
state to remove children from their parents, especially their mothers. It is inspired by Professor
Judith Mosoff, who examined child protection decisions in British Columbia over two decades
ago, finding that women with mental disabilities tended to lose their children on the basis of
psychiatric opinion that appeared to apply an implicit presumption against their fitness as
parents.1 She identified the interplay between “scientific” psy-discourses and ideological
expectations of motherhood as key factors. Professor Mosoff re-visited and broadened this field
of research more recently, hoping that the world had changed over the last 20 years in ways that
could affect the issue. Due to her illness and untimely death in December 2015, her co-authors
made it a priority to complete and write up her research. The study examines child protection
decisions in British Columbia, which overwhelmingly are about single mothers who experience
mental disability,2 addiction, male violence and poverty. Indigenous mothers are
overrepresented, which is not surprising given the inter-generational impact of removing children
from families and communities.
Several developments have occurred since the early 1990s when Professor Mosoff
conducted her initial research. On a positive note, in 2010 Canada signed the UN Convention on

1

Judith Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” (1995) 45:2 UTLJ 107 [Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and
Law”]. See also Judith Mosoff, “‘A Jury Dressed in Medical White and Judicial Black’: Mothers with Mental
Health Histories in Child Welfare and Custody” in Susan B Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/Private Divide:
Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 227 [Mosoff, “A Jury”].
2
We use the term mental disability broadly to include developmental disabilities, psychiatric disabilities, and other
related mental health labels that may be seen as relevant to a person's ability to parent. Mental disability is the
language of the equality guarantee in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in most
human rights legislation. See: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.

the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,3 a treaty that emphasizes the inclusion of people with
disabilities in all aspects of life and entitlements to the necessary accommodations that facilitate
inclusion. Article 23 specifically guarantees people with disabilities the right to family life, the
right to appropriate supports in raising children, and provides that no family should be separated
simply because a child or a parent has a disability.4 As well, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission has drawn attention to the dire consequences of the residential school system for
indigenous communities, families, and children in Canada.5 In May 2016, Canada officially
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.6
At the same time as these human rights developments, an overall and arguably
accelerating decline in social welfare benefits has occurred during an era of changing economic
policies worldwide. These cutbacks correspond to the values of the neoliberal state, which
emphasize personal or individual (rather than collective) responsibility and risk prevention.7

3
4

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 189 UNTS 137 [CRPD].
For example, Article 23 on Respect for home and the family states, inter alia:

2. States Parties shall ensure the rights and responsibilities of persons with disabilities, with
regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship, adoption of children or similar institutions,
where these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the best interests of the child
shall be paramount. States Parties shall render appropriate assistance to persons with
disabilities in the performance of their child-rearing responsibilities.
…
4. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against
their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in
accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best
interests of the child. In no case shall a child be separated from parents on the basis of a
disability of either the child or one or both of the parents.
(CRPD, supra note 3).
5
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of
the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada, 2015)
<http://www.myrobust.com/websites/trcinstitution/File/Reports/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf> accessed 3
June 2016 [Truth and Reconciliation Report].
6
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc
A/RES/61/295, (2007); “Canada officially adopts UN declaration on rights of Indigenous Peoples”, CBC News (10
May 2016) online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/aboriginal/canada-adopting-implementing-un-rightsdeclaration-1.3575272>.
7
This trend began in the 1970s but has accelerated with neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state since the early
1990s. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism (Toronto:

These values interact problematically with the ideological expectations placed upon mothers to
ensure the health and well-being of their children.8 Mothers are expected to be selflessly
available to their children. If possible, they should take responsibility for the primary care of
their children in the context of a two parent family (preferably heterosexual) that is premised on
female dependence upon a breadwinner (usually male).9 Many mothers find it difficult to meet
this normative expectation of the selfless, full time mother and, certainly, most mothers in our
study experienced challenges that made it very difficult for them to do so. A majority were single
mothers with no reliable partner to assist them financially. The men that they were involved with
were rarely viewed by judges as ideal father figures. As a result, the women were reliant on the
ever-shrinking welfare state if they were not able to find work that also permitted them to
adequately care for their children, a challenge in a country with inadequate daycare.
The retraction of state responsibility and emphasis on personal responsibility have serious
ramifications for women who need state support to raise their children. The expectations of
personal responsibility are particularly problematic for mothers with mental disabilities, as they
are seldom able to meet the demands of autonomy and selflessness due to poverty as well as the
need to meet the requirements of the mental health system.10 Moreover, as we shall see, risk
assessment is an important part of modern child protection in British Columbia. Yet the ideology
of risk can distort and deflect attention away from the relations of race, class and gender that are
University of Toronto Press, 2002); Janine Brodie, “The New Social “isms”: Individualization and Social Policy
Reform in Canada” in Cosmo Howard, ed, Contested Individualization (New York: Palgrave MacMillan US, 2007)
153; Shelley AM Gavigan & Dorothy E Chunn, “From Mothers’ Allowance to Mothers Need Not Apply: Canadian
Welfare Law as Liberal and Neo-liberal Reforms” (2007) 44:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 733.
8
Barbara Ehrenreich & Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts’ Advice to Women (London:
Pluto Press, 1979); Susan P Penfold & Gillian A Walker, Women and the Psychiatric Paradox (Montreal: Eden
Press, 1983). On child protection, see Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law
and First Nation Women” (1993) 18 Queen's LJ 306 [Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”].
9
See, for more detail, Susan B Boyd, “Motherhood and Law: Constructing and Challenging Normativity” in
Margaret Davies & Vanessa E Munro, eds, The Ashgate Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Farnham, Surrey:
Ashgate, 2013) 267 at 268-270 [Boyd, “Motherhood and Law”]; Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of
Motherhood”, supra note 8 at 301-311.
10
Mosoff, “A Jury”, supra note 1 at 238.

structured into child protection processes. Poor, single mothers especially are constructed as a
“risk class”, “who can legitimately be intruded upon, scrutinized indefinitely and held to account
for their daily activities”.11 Similarly, the experience of indigenous mothers reveals a history of
colonialist and racist processes of regulation of indigenous families, yet child protection law
tends to erase this history through the supposedly neutral application of the best interests of the
child standard, the key legal principle in child protection law.12
Another change since Professor Mosoff’s early 1990s work is that the incidence of
children labelled with “special needs” has increased, especially diagnoses in ADHD and autistic
spectrum disorder. This expansion has been a source of significant controversy within the
psychiatric system.13 As we shall see, the coincidence of a mother with a mental disability and a
child with “special needs” arises not infrequently in the case law, and identification of a child as
“special needs” often makes it more difficult for the mother to retain custody.
This paper argues that despite positive developments such as the ratification of the CRPD
and the greater attention to indigenous families, mothers encounter major challenges in the child
11

Karen Swift, “Risky Women: The Role of Risk in the Construction of the Single Mother” in Shelley AM Gavigan
& Deirdre E Chunn, eds, The Legal Tender of Gender: Law, Welfare and the Regulation of Women’s Poverty
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 143 [Karen Swift, “Risky Women”].
12
Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”, supra note 8.
13
One study found that the prevalence of childhood disability has grown by 15.6% between 2001 and 2011: Amy J
Houtrow et al, “Changing Trends of Childhood Disability, 2001-2011”(2014) 134:3 Pediatrics 530. It is difficult to
identify precise rates of autism because different sources present different numbers. What is clear, however, is that
there has been a significant increase in the number of children with this diagnosis. Autism has been described as
“skyrocketing” to an estimated rate of 1 child in 100: Benedict Carey, “New Definition of Autism Will Exclude
Many” (19 January 2012), The New York Times, online: <www.nytimes.com>. The CDC has found that the rate of
diagnosis for autism in children has increased from 1 in 150 children in 2000 to 1 in 68 in 2012: Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, “Autism Spectrum Disorder: Data and Statistics” (31 March 2016), online:
<www.cdc.gov>. See also: Hélène Ouellette-Kuntz et al, “The changing prevalence of autism in three regions of
Canada” (2014) 44 J Autism Dev Disord 120 in which researchers found average annual percent increases in
prevalence among children 2 to 14 years of age ranging from 9.7% to 14.6%.
The CDC also reports that “Rates of ADHD diagnosis increased an average of 3% per year from 1997 to 2006 and
an average of approximately 5% per year from 2003 to 2011”: Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
“Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD): Data and Statistics” (15 March 2016), online: <www.cdc.gov>.
Another study found that the rate of ADHD diagnosis in children and teens increased by 43% between 2002 and
2011: Kathy Fackelman, “New Report Finds 43% Increase in ADHD Diagnosis for US Schoolchildren” (8
December 2015), George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health ,online:
<http://publichealth.gwu.edu/content/new-report-finds-43-percent-increase-adhd-diagnosis-us-schoolchildren-0>.

protection system, in large part as a result of cutbacks to material supports. If anything, social,
political and legal changes have had a negative effect on those caught up in this system. Despite
an increase in procedural safeguards for those at risk of losing their children to the state, at the
stage in the process where a court must consider whether to make a final order that severs a
parental relationship, the answer is still yes in a large majority of cases. Ideologically, mothers’
rights are often constructed as oppositional to the rights of their children, which undermines the
connection that exists between them. This oppositional construction can also result in women
being defined as failing to adequately protect their children, even if a risk to the child is
generated by factors largely outside the woman’s control, such as poverty or a violent partner.14
Both scenarios feature frequently in the cases we reviewed.
Identifying the problematic effects of the ideology of motherhood does not, of course,
answer all questions posed in child protection law, although it is important to read the
jurisprudence with these ideological currents in mind. Professor Mosoff emphasized in her
earlier work that criticism “of how the child protection process works to disadvantage women
with mental health histories is not meant to suggest that protecting children is not crucially
important” nor that “any mother, regardless of her actions is entitled to remain a custodial parent
with no intervention by the state or other entities.”15 Inevitably in some circumstances a parent
will be unable to provide a safe environment for children. The safety of children is paramount
and sometimes will mean severing parental ties. These difficult cases often involve women in
extremely challenging circumstances. For many, violence and substance abuse permeate their
lives and extreme poverty and lack of safe housing are facts of life. Very often their children

14
15

Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”, supra note 8 at 301-311.
Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law”, supra note 1 at 111.

have behavioural and other challenges that keep families under constant scrutiny by child
protection authorities.
Despite these harsh realities, we believe that more efforts can and must be made to keep
children with their mothers. Our project is to interrogate the negative ways that structures,
policies and attitudes about gender, poverty, male violence and disability infuse judicial analysis
and ask whether some factors inappropriately limit the ability of mothers to retain their status as
parents. The discourse in these cases suggests courts, social workers, and other helping
professionals frequently fail to examine the role of socio-economic structures in constructing
mental disability and the barriers to parenting it creates. Instead women are blamed for problems
like their lack of housing and the violence inflicted against them by men. As Professor Mosoff
observed, mothers with mental disabilities have historically been perceived by law to be like
children, so it is often more difficult to see them as capable of taking caring of their own
children.16 In fact, with proper social and material supports, they might well be able to do so
more often. The questions of how much and what kind of support should be provided looms
large in this paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first explain the law reform history and legislative
framework that form a backdrop to our case law study. We then present the findings from our
case law study. Several themes that emanate from the case law are discussed, including poverty
and single motherhood, the construction of disability, the intersection of a child’s “special needs”
with maternal disability, domestic violence and, finally, the obligations on the state to provide
material resources to women to enable them to parent. The overrepresentation of Indigenous
women is woven throughout our discussion. The conclusion offers the insights drawn from our
study and argues that, if some of the conditions under which the mothers in our case law study
16

Ibid at 113.

struggle could be dealt with constructively, through material supports, fewer families would face
the devastating impact of child apprehension. We also conclude that judges should be more
cautious about immersing a child into the foster care system without scrutinizing the limits and
dangers of that system.

The Statutory Framework

In British Columbia, the child protection regime is governed by a lengthy and complex statute,
the 1996 BC Child, Family and Community Services Act (CFCSA).17 Its enactment followed a
law reform process that was intended to create a modern child protection statute that would
emphasize family autonomy and limit state intervention, a philosophy that was already being
followed to a considerable extent by social workers.18 Ultimately this philosophy was diluted by
a greater emphasis on child safety, largely due to a high profile child death at the hands of his
mother,19 which also put more pressure on social workers to identify and avert risky situations.
As is typical for “modern” child protection statutes, the CFCSA includes far more
significant procedural safeguards (including limits on the duration of various orders) for parents
than the previous legislation had offered. As Hall explains, however, the statute embraces two
contradictory visions, a family-centred approach and a child-centred approach.20 For example,
the Guiding Principles state, inter alia, that (b) “the family is the preferred environment for the
17

Child, Family and Community Service Act, RSBC 1996, c 46 [CFCSA]. We discuss here only the provisions most
salient to our inquiry.
18
Margaret Hall, “A Ministry for Children: Abandoning the Interventionist Debate in British Columbia” (1998) 12:2
Int'l JL Pol'y & Fam 121 [Hall, “A Ministry for Children”].
19
Hon Judge Thomas Gove, Gove Inquiry into Child Protection, Final Report Vol. 1, Matthew's Story. Vol 2,
Matthews Legacy (Victoria: Queens Printer, 1995). Andrew Armitage, “Lost Vision: Children and the Ministry for
Children and Families” (1998) 118 BC Studies 93 at 92, 102-104; Hall, “A Ministry for Children”, supra note 18;
Hester Lessard, "The Empire of the Lone Mother: Parental Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring"
(2001) 39:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 717. See also Isabel Grant & Judith Mosoff, “Supporting our Families, Protecting
Children”, Vancouver Sun (8 December 1995) A19.
20
Hall, “A Ministry for Children”, supra note 18 at 137.

care and upbringing of children and the responsibility for the protection of children rests
primarily with the parents” and (c) “if, with available support services, a family can provide a
safe and nurturing environment for a child, support services should be provided”.21 These
principles could be interpreted to encourage mothers to raise their children with appropriate
support services (but only if “available”). However, other important Guiding Principles
emphasize that “children are entitled to be protected from abuse, neglect and harm or threat of
harm” and the section starts out stating that the Act “must be interpreted and administered so that
the safety and well-being of children are the paramount considerations”. The section outlining
factors relevant to a child’s best interests similarly emphasizes safety alongside other factors.22
Another significant law reform was an expansion of the grounds on which a child may be
found in need of protection, which is the crucial first step in a child being removed either
temporarily or permanently. Specifically, children can now be found in need of protection if
there is a risk of future harm, whereas previously the harm must have already occurred. For
example, a child needs protection if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed
because of neglect by the child's parent.23 The risk-based inquiry increases the need for social
workers (and judges) to predict future harm and mental disability, poverty and domestic violence
inevitably play an important role in these risk assessments. The test to be applied for risk of
future harm is lower than that used to determine past harm.24 The focus on future harm has
resulted in the adoption of standardized risk assessment models, a practice that has been the

21

CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 2 [emphasis added].
Ibid at s 4.
23
Ibid at s 13(1)(d) [emphasis added].
24
BS v British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), (1998) BCJ No 1085 at paras 27-30;
British Columbia (Superintendent of Family & Child Services) v GC, (1989) BCJ No 1577 at para 38; British
Columbia (Superintendent of Family and Child Services) v BM, (1982) BCJ No 468 at para 27.
22

subject of considerable criticism from social workers and researchers.25 Because mental illness
or intellectual impairments are seen as risk factors for future harm, using these models is likely
to have a particular impact on parents with mental disabilities.26 Once identified, such parents
will be viewed with stricter scrutiny. The case law also reveals an overrepresentation of children
labelled as "special needs", another complicating factor to the risk calculation. Since these
children may have been identified as being at higher risk by other state systems, such as
education and health, there is heightened surveillance on these families.
A child is also in need of protection if the child’s parent is unable or unwilling to care for
the child and has not made adequate provision for the child’s care.27 According to Pivot Legal
Society, this is the most commonly cited reason for removal of a child, at 47% followed by
neglect at 25%.28 The CFCSA also includes a “failure to protect” ground, so that a child will be
in need of protection if they have been, or are likely to be, “physically harmed, sexually abused
or sexual exploited by another person and if the child’s parent is unwilling or unable to protect
the child.”29 Even more specific is a section stating that a child is in need of protection if he or
she is “emotionally harmed by living in a situation where there is domestic violence by or

25

See e.g. Ronald C Hughes & Judith S Rycusa, “Issues in Risk Assessment in Child Protective Services” (2006)
1:1 Journal of Public Child Welfare 85; Stan Houston & Huw Griffiths, “Reflections on Risk in Child Protection: Is
it Time for a Shift in Paradigms?” (2000) 5:1 Child & Family Social Work 1; Sheryl Brissett-Chapman, “Child
Protection Risk Assessment and African American Children: Cultural Ramifications for Families and Communities”
(1997) 76:1 Child Welfare 45; Karen Swift & Marilyn Callahan, At Risk: Social Justice in Child Welfare and Other
Human Services (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) [Swift & Callahan, “At Risk”]. See also Pivot Legal
Society, Broken Promises: Parents Speak about B.C.’s Child Welfare System (Vancouver: Pivot Legal Society,
2008) at 84-89, online:
<http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/pivotlegal/legacy_url/310/BrokenPromises.pdf?1345765642 > [Pivot Legal
Society, Broken Promises].
26
British Columbia, Child Protection Consultation Services, The Risk Assessment Model for Child Protection in
British Columbia (Victoria: Ministry for Children & Families, Child Protection Consultation Services, 1996). There
appears to be no more recent copy of this document. See Karen Swift and Marilyn Callahan articles about risk
assessment models from the perspective of social workers: Swift & Callahan, “At Risk”, supra note 25. On single
mothers and risk assessment, see Karen Swift, “Risky Women”, supra note 11 at 143.
27
CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 13(1)(h).
28
Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises, supra note 25 at 87, 89, 97.
29
CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 13(1)(c).

towards a person with whom the child resides.”30 A mother who is perceived to have failed to
protect her child by continuing to live with an abusive man, perhaps due to poverty or lack of
housing options, can find her child removed as a result, even if she is not herself abusive.
A new Ministry for Children and Families (now the Ministry of Children and Family
Development) was also introduced in 1996. This Ministry has primary responsibility under the
CFCSA to keep children safe and it merged various functions of child protection and family
support that had previously been carried out by several Ministries. The rationale was to create a
seamless system of assistance for those families that needed help in raising children and a
watchfulness for those children who could be in peril. In line with many other public entities in
the era of neoliberalism, the Ministry shifted to a model of practice where efficiency was
paramount. The overall result is that family support and child protection are now officially
intermingled, with an emphasis on efficient processes and formal accountability. This change
does not seem to have resulted in a positive experience for mothers, in part due to the challenges
that budgetary cutbacks generate for social workers themselves, due to high caseloads.31
Psychiatrists, public health nurses, homemakers, social workers, and parenting course
instructors all have dual roles in the child protection system.32 On the one hand, these workers
provide support, services or treatment to a mother and/or her children. On the other hand, they
are potential witnesses against the mother in child protection proceedings. Such professionals are
often seen as better qualified than the mother herself to describe her life, her challenges, her
ability to parent and the needs of her children. While judges do not qualify such persons as
formal experts, they are often treated as de facto experts, especially in comparison with the
mother. Rarely is there a case when a witness adverse to the mother’s interest did not start out as
30

Ibid at s 13(1)(e)(ii).
Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises, supra note 25 at 60-71.
32
Ibid at 61-62.
31

someone providing assistance, making receipt of services, often necessary for successful
parenting, a double-edged sword.33 Yet, as we shall see, judges seldom interrogate the conflicted
roles of the personnel working within those systems who are the providers of services, those with
the authority to terminate services and those who later give evidence in applications to terminate
the parental relationship.34 Moreover, many of the supports that this personnel provide are “soft”
supports (e.g. parenting education) rather than material supports (e.g. housing, respite care) that
might make it more possible for socio-economically marginalized families to keep their
children.35 As a result, the modern non-interventionist child protection statutes protect familial
autonomy far less than they should.36
People with mental disabilities, especially when they are poor, already have a higher
level of contact with state agencies, services and health professionals than people without
disabilities. The need to rely on services has implications for many aspects of an individual’s
life, but particular effects arise in the child protection context. Despite the fact that a diagnosis of
mental disability is probably a poor predictor of parenting capacity,37 parents with mental

33

See e.g. Callie Westad & David McConnell, “Child Welfare Involvement of Mothers with Mental Health Issues”
(2012) 48 Community Ment Health J 29 [Westad & McConnell, “Child Welfare Involvement”]; Leslie Doty
Hollingsworth, “Child Custody Loss Among Women with Persistent Severe Mental Illness” (2004) 28:4 Social
Work Research 199 [Hollingsworth, “Child Custody Loss”].
34
This too was an issue in Mosoff’s earlier research: Mosoff, “Motherhood, Madness, and Law” supra note 1 and
Mosoff, “A Jury”, supra note 1. For a notable exception, see British Columbia (Director of Family and Child
Services) v FC, 2004 BCPC 531 at para 18 [Director v FC], where the judge was very critical of the Director for
having stopped trying to provide supports for the mother once the decision was made to seek a CCO. Nonetheless
the judge did go on to grant a CCO with unsupervised access to the mother.
35
On the significance of housing as a material support, especially to marginalized people, see: Paula Goering et al,
National At Home/Chez Soi Final Report (Calgary, AB: Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2014).
36
Luther makes this point in the Nova Scotia context, emphasizing the difference between material and other
supports: Ilana Luther, On the “Poverty of Responsibility”: A Study of the History of Child Protection Law and
Jurisprudence in Nova Scotia (PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2015) online:
<dalspace.library.dal.ca/handle/10222/61015> at Chapter 5 [Luther, “Poverty of Responsibility”].
37
Carol Mowbray, Daphna Oyserman, Deborah Bybee & Peter MacFarlane, “Parenting of Mothers with Serious
Mental Illness: Differential Effects of Diagnosis, Clinical History, and other Mental Health Variables” (2002) 26:4
Social Work Research 225 at 237.

disabilities are more likely to be investigated by child protection authorities.38 They are also
more likely to lose custody of their children.39
Until 2013, under the CFCSA, the main way that parents could lose permanent custody of
their children was through continuing custody orders (CCOs), under which the Director becomes
the sole personal guardian of the child and may consent to the child’s adoption.40 A CCO can be
made at two different stages in child protection proceedings. Section 41 allows for a CCO to be
made at a protection hearing, in rare circumstances such as when the identity or location of a
parent cannot be found and is not likely to be found; a parent is unable or unwilling to resume
custody; or the nature and extent of the harm the child has suffered or the likelihood that the
child will suffer harm is such that there is little prospect it would be in the child’s best interests
to be returned to the parent.41 Section 49 allows the Director to apply to a court for a CCO not
sooner than 60 days before a temporary custody order (which would more commonly be ordered
at a protection hearing) expires. The court must order continuing custody if, for instance, a parent
is unable or unwilling to resume custody of the child42 and it “may” order continuing custody if
there is no significant likelihood that the circumstances that led to the child’s removal will

38

Adrian Falkov, Parental Psychiatric Disorder and Child Maltreatment Part I: Context and Historical Overview
(London: National Children’s Bureau Highlight No 148, 1996); Adrian Falkov, Parental Psychiatric Disorder and
Child Maltreatment Part I: Context and Historical Overview (London: National Children’s Bureau Highlight No
149,1997); Adam M Tomison, “Child Maltreatment and Mental Disorder”, National Child Protection Clearing
House Discussion Paper No 3 (Commonwealth of Australia: Australian Institute of Family Studies, 1996) cited in
Vanessa Lewis & Susan J Creighton, “Parental Mental Health as a Child Protection Issue: Data from the NSPCC
National Child Protection Helpline” (1999) 8 Child Abuse Review 152 at 153.
39
Hollingsworth, “Child Custody Loss”, supra note 33 at 199.
40
CFCSA, supra note 17 at 50(1)(a). Since 2013, s 54.01 allows the Director to apply to a court to permanently
transfer custody of a child to someone other than the child’s parent prior to a CCO being made. This other person
must be either someone who has a relationship with the child or has a cultural or traditional responsibility toward the
child and has been given care of the child by the child’s parent, if the Director already has an agreement with this
person (see s 8) or someone who has temporary custody under certain sections of the CFCSA. (s 54.01 en 2011-1320, effective February 1, 2013 (BC Reg 274/2012); am 2011-2-291, effective March 28, 2013 (BC Reg 131/2012)).
Section 54.1 allows for permanent transfer of custody after a CCO is made.
41
Ibid at s 41(2). It is more common that temporary custody orders are made at a protection hearing. CCOs may also
be ordered under s 42.2(4)(d) or (7).
42
Ibid at s 50(4)(b).

improve within a reasonable time or that the parent will be able to meet the child’s needs.43 In
rare circumstances, a CCO can be cancelled if the circumstances have changed significantly and
cancelling the order is in the child’s best interests.44Access may be granted to a parent
notwithstanding a CCO, although it is often denied to facilitate adoption45 and normally
terminates if the child is adopted by anyone other than a family member.46
If a court does not make a CCO, section 49(7) requires it to either return custody of the
child to the parent, order that the child remain in temporary custody of another person for a
specified period of up to six months, or order that the child be in temporary custody of the
Director for a specified period up to six months. The latter two orders are sometimes referred to
colloquially as “last chance orders”.

Our Study

Our study examines all reported judgments in applications for continuing custody orders
(CCOs) under the BC CFCSA from January 2002 to June 2015.47 We chose these judgments as
our focus for several reasons. First, as a matter of law, child protection files in BC are sealed to
protect the privacy of families, making reported decisions the only easily accessible window into
43
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how courts apply child protection legislation to families.48 Second, CCOs represent a final step in
what is sometimes a long history of dealings between parents and the Ministry. Most of the
children at issue in these cases have been in and out of state care for a considerable period of
time. At no point in the process are the stakes higher for children and families because CCOs
terminate the legal relationship between a child and parent (almost always) permanently. They
have been described by one American scholar as the “death penalty of civil cases.”49 The CCO
hearings constitute the final opportunity for parents to challenge the state in a formal venue.
Reported CCO cases thus allow us to explore the circumstances under which a court is willing to
permit this profound intervention into the lives of children and parents. Finally, while not
without their limitations,50 studies of judicial discourse offer an important insight into how
attitudes are shaped and reflected at a critical site in the child protection process.
The CCO cases themselves do not tell us how the system operates as a whole,51 nor the
sometimes unseen processes through which parents may eventually lose custody. For example,
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parents may make voluntary agreements to receive support services such as counselling or
respite care52 or to give temporary care of the child to the Director. Although these agreements
are time limited, the legislation permits renewal for various periods, so a child could be outside a
parent’s care under a voluntary agreement for a considerable time, even years. Once a CCO is
granted, the Director becomes the sole personal guardian of the child and may consent to the
child’s adoption.53 A parent can also consent to various orders, including a CCO,54 in which case
a court does not need to find that the child is in need of protection and the parent is not viewed as
admitting any of the grounds alleged for removal of the child.55
While our study is not a complete representation of all CCOs during this period, the cases
show us how judges balance the various factors listed in the legislation and how the best interests
of the child principle is interpreted alongside other principles, such as the concern to keep
children with families where possible.

An Analysis of BC Child Protection Jurisprudence
Key Characteristics of the CCO Cases

We do not purport to offer a quantitative analysis of the 85 reported CCO decisions that we
found,56 but several observations can be made about them.57 First, these cases are
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overwhelmingly gendered. Although it is difficult to count precisely how many "single mothers"
were involved,58 many of the women had very fluid relationships, in the sense that men were in
and out of their lives and not a stable presence in the mother’s or the child’s life. If we consider
women who are responsible for raising their children in the absence of a stable male partner in a
paternal role as being “single mothers”, then a large majority of the cases involve single mothers,
a fact rarely noted by judges. Often when fathers are also named in the application, they take no
part in the hearing. Given that mothers generally bear the brunt of caregiving work, and that
caregiving work is undervalued, these responsibilities appear to be taken for granted.59 Much
less, if anything, is expected of fathers.60 Some of our cases involve two parents, but only rarely
was the only party to the application a single father.61 Instead of focusing on the challenges faced
by a woman raising children alone, judges were more likely to criticize her for her poor choices,
58
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such as the men with whom she associates and her lifestyle, especially where addiction is a
factor. No same sex parents appeared in the sample.
Second, poverty is pervasive in these cases, often overlapping with disability, as not only
are persons with mental health issues among Canada’s poorest citizens, but poverty itself is a risk
factor for poor mental health.62A large majority of the cases involved a woman raising children
in conditions of extreme economic disadvantage and social marginalization, consistent with other
data that shows that apprehensions occur more often in poor families63 headed by lone mothers.64
Many women were struggling to raise several children on very low levels of support.
Third, maternal mental disability and/or addiction issues are prevalent in these cases and
play a significant role in judicial decision-making. In 63 of 85 cases (74%), the primary
respondent was labelled as having a mental disability65 and in one case the primary respondent
was a father with a physical disability. In an additional 14 cases, the primary respondent was
labelled with a substance abuse issue. In 31 cases (36%), the primary respondent was labelled
with both a mental disability and a substance abuse disorder. Thus in only eight cases (9%) was
the primary respondent labelled with neither a substance abuse problem nor a mental disability.
Addiction in these cases is not usually characterized as a disability but rather as a lifestyle
choice.
Fourth, 48 cases (56%) involved at least one child who was identified as having “special
needs” and courts appear to be more willing to sever these relationships on the basis that children
with special needs demand not only competent, but exceptional, parenting.
62
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Trocmé, “CIS Report, 2008”, supra note 51 includes poverty as a risk factor. Getting social assistance or other
benefits as a “household risk” in 33 % of substantiated child maltreatment investigations.
64
This is consistent with the Canadian Incidence Study on substantiated maltreatment, ibid, which tells us that 91
percent of primary care givers in substantiated maltreatment cases are women.
65
Some of these respondents also had physical disabilities in addition to the mental disability.

Fifth, violence in various forms was very prevalent in these cases. More than half of
these cases involved male violence against the mother (54%).66 Male violence against children
was present in 18% of cases67 and mothers were violent against children in 9% of cases.68 While
men are only occasionally primary respondents at CCO hearings, they nonetheless loom large in
the reasons issued by judges, usually as a problem for mothers seeking to retain custody. Fathers
and/or boyfriends are usually not a consistent presence in the children’s lives and, in fact, are just
as likely to be seen as threats either because they are violent to the mother or because they are
involved with selling drugs or other criminal activity. The typical response of the child
protection system to cases where male violence or criminality creates a risk to the child is to
displace children by removing them from the mother because they are not safe from a male
threat. This threat is construed as being against the child only; little concern is demonstrated
about the ongoing danger to the mother.
Sixth, Indigenous mothers are overrepresented in these CCO cases. In 23 of the 85 cases
(27%), the primary respondent was identified as Indigenous, probably an underestimate as this
fact may not be mentioned in every decision and our count only includes cases where an explicit
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reference to indigeneity was made. It is estimated that up to 60% of children in care in British
Columbia, including through voluntary agreements, are Indigenous.69 More broadly, Canada has
a long history of child apprehensions of indigenous children who, historically, were often taken
from their families and their communities and placed for adoption with nonindigenous families.70
In response to this history, the current statute requires courts to consider the importance of
preserving a child’s cultural identity in assessing the best interests of the child, although it does
not mandate a particular outcome.71
Seventh, the inter-generational impact of state control over the families who are subject
to CCO applications is demonstrated by the number of respondents who were themselves
children in care. Roughly 30% of the mothers in this sample had been children “in care,”72
challenging the notion that children who are apprehended will necessarily fare better once
removed from their parent. In addition, many of these women had lost multiple children to prior
child apprehension proceedings.73
Finally, and most significantly, a large majority of the mothers had their relationships to
their children severed by the court. In 63 of the 85 cases (74%) CCOs were granted for at least
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one child.74 Of the 22 remaining cases, the children were returned to the mother in seven cases,
left in the temporary custody of the director in six cases and left in the temporary custody of a
family member in three cases. In the remaining six cases, custody was granted to another family
member.75 By the time the cases made it to this final stage, the result often appeared to be
almost inevitable. We now turn to an examination of the judicial discourses in the cases.

Analysis of Judicial Discourse
(i) The Challenges of Poverty and Single Motherhood: More Than a “Lifestyle” Choice?
In many of the cases, judges rely heavily on what they refer to as poor "lifestyle" choices
or "chaotic lifestyles" that are incompatible with parental responsibilities.76 Lifestyle choices in
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these cases may include anything from drug addiction,77 unstable or lack of housing,78 civil
commitment,79 family violence, and even poverty.80 In SH, for example, in granting the CCO, the
court stated:
The key factor which gives rise to current protection concerns for this 11 month
old infant is the mother's failure to accept that there were, and continue to be,
risks to her child's safety related to her history of drug use and her lifestyle
choices. Those choices have resulted in instability, family violence, financial
difficulties, lack of regular or appropriate health care, and a highly nomadic
existence of living in vessels, hotels, or latterly in a Winnebago trailer home.81
The court’s suggestion that the violence and poverty experienced by the mother were a result of
“lifestyle choices” posits a false notion of choice for many of these women and suggests a failure
to appreciate the broader context of the mother’s life.
If a mother's circumstances are explained in terms of choices, she is more likely to be
portrayed as immature and self-involved rather than as someone dealing with very difficult life
circumstances. Constructing mothers as autonomous subjects, whose life circumstances are the
consequences of their own freely made choices, also helps provide a sense of justice being done
in cases which otherwise often admit of no easy answers. However, where poverty, spousal
abuse, and disability are key aspects of the mother’s experience, casting responsibility on her for
systemic issues largely beyond her control obscures the constraints that circumscribe her agency.
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It places blame on the mother as an individual while failing to sufficiently scrutinize the role of
government and society in constructing the barriers these mothers face and in failing to provide
adequate assistance to surmount them. The problem with framing systemic problems in the
language of “lifestyle” choices was described succinctly by Marlee Kline:
Altogether, the characterization of battering and alcohol and drug dependency as
personal problems reinforces the placing of blame for child neglect on the
deficiencies of individual mothers, and obscures the roots of the difficulties First
Nation mothers face in more systemic oppressive relations including historical
and continuing colonialist and racist practices.82
Judges are not always insensitive to the systemic nature of the issues facing the parents
appearing before them. Nevertheless, even women’s significant efforts to improve their
circumstances and so-called “lifestyle” choices may not prove to be enough to retain custody of
their children. In ST,83 for example, the mother had successfully completed a year-long parenting
course and witnesses from that course testified to the significant improvements she had made as
well as her recent willingness to seek out support from social services and from her own mother.
Despite this testimony supporting the mother’s position, a CCO was ordered based on a number
of factors such as her need for stable housing, her ongoing use of marijuana and cigarettes in the
child’s presence, and a lack of cleanliness in the home. The judge said to the mother after
granting the CCO:
I have now spent the better part of seven court days dealing with the life of a 19month-old child and her 28-year-old mother. I have heard from the mother what
her life has been like. I want her to know that I admire all that she is done to
better equip her to be a good mother. I have concluded that she is sincere in her
wish to be a good mother. She has suffered so many disadvantages in her life
that I have concluded that she does not now have the ability to safely and
effectively care for her daughter. Other people, who also care about her daughter
will be given that responsibility so that she can grow up healthy and secure. I
hope that [the mother] will be reassured and even be somewhat comforted by the
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Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood”, supra note 8 at 322.
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fact her daughter has been and will be well cared for and will likely have
opportunities in her life that [the mother] was never given.84
Not only is this woman told that her extraordinary efforts to improve her “lifestyle” fall short,
she is also expected to be grateful to the Ministry for finding a better home for her daughter.
This mother is expected to be so “selfless” that she can be comforted by her child being taken
from her care.
(ii) The Construction of Mental Disability
As we have noted, mental disability is an important intersecting factor in many of the
cases we studied. Despite increasing societal acceptance of the rights and ability of people with
mental disabilities to be parents, the medical model of disability85 continues to serve as the
dominant paradigm through which mothers with mental disabilities are understood in child
protection decisions.86 While mental disability is not, in and of itself, a reason for terminating a
parent’s relationship with her child, it continues to be treated as a risk factor at crucial stages of
the child protection process.87 It is consistently portrayed in negative terms, as an individual
affliction, frequently obscuring the role of society in constructing the barriers mothers with
disabilities face and failing to assist mothers in confronting the challenges of parenting, for
84
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example by alleviating poverty and providing services. Perhaps contradictory to the medical
model, however, women are also blamed for their mental disability, as if it were a matter of
personal choice, rather than a function of other indices of social disadvantage such as poverty
and addiction, and their own experience in the child protection system as children.
Many women in these cases have been given multiple diagnoses throughout their contact
with the child protection and mental health systems. These labels often trigger high levels of
state surveillance and some women have never been given the opportunity to interact with their
children except in the presence of social workers.88 Personality disorders, such as borderline
personality disorder89 or dependent personality disorder,90 are frequently included in the list of
diagnoses given to these women.91 These labels are disproportionately attached to women and
suggest that these women have struggled to cope with their social circumstances, or to escape
abusive and controlling relationships. Feminist scholars have argued that the DSM definitions of
these disorders are gendered both in their criteria and in their application.92 Dependent
personality disorder, for example, has been referred to as little more than a “caricature of the
traditional female role.”93 These disorders are supposedly lifelong conditions and do not lead to
88
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any type of treatment, but rather act as descriptors of what is construed as women’s inadequacy
in coping and, in the context of child protection, their inadequacy to parent.
Many of these women were themselves children in care, apprehended from their own
mothers, and left to struggle through the foster care system.94 The impact of this kind of
childhood not surprisingly leads to diagnoses that label the woman as having poor impulse
control or an excessive need for nurturance. Others have had their children taken from their care
at birth, which can affect both the woman’s ability to present herself as a competent mother and
also her mental health status. For the Indigenous mothers, in particular, state involvement in
their families and communities may extend back generations. Furthermore, because personality
disorders are seen as lifelong, even where a woman has taken steps to improve her functioning,
judges may doubt her ability to maintain those gains. In RD,95 for example, where a mother had
left a violent relationship, the judge noted that the personality traits which led her to the
unhealthy relationship had not changed and therefore that the child was at risk in the future.96 In
another case, the hearing featured conflicting testimony about whether the mother suffered from
schizotypal personality disorder.97 If that diagnosis were substantiated, the judge indicated that it
would be determinative of her future ability to parent: “[i]f the mother does suffer from that
disorder, then it is highly unlikely that she would ever be able to significantly improve her
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parenting abilities.”98 If the diagnosis of depression were correct, by contrast, then there was
hope that the mother could learn to parent.99 Such labels are far from neutral.
The intersection between disability and idealized constructions of motherhood can be
seen in various different ways throughout the case law. Women with disabilities are infantilized
and construed as insufficiently self-sacrificing. These traits, in turn, make them unfit mothers.
Critical disability and legal scholars have convincingly demonstrated that across a range of
discourses, women with mental disabilities are often constructed as needy, dependent, childlike
and asexual.100 Representatives of the Director, psychologists and judges continue to label
mothers with mental disabilities with descriptors such as naïve, dependent, immature or
childlike. Such descriptors stand as markers for the absence of qualities expected of mothers,
such as the ability to assume independent and autonomous responsibility for a child. By existing
in opposition to normative understandings of what makes a fit mother, the “child stereotype”
accorded to these women naturalizes the eventual termination of their legal rights to be
parents.101 Children cannot parent children and thus, by implication, nor can those who are
“childlike”.
It is not uncommon to see women described with multiple child-like characteristics, such
as “friendly but self-absorbed”, “alarmingly” and “amazingly” naïve, and “psychologically much
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younger than her years.”102 Mothers are described as being “prone to emotional role reversals
with [their] children” and as confusing their “own emotional needs with the needs of [their]
children”.103 RM104 involved a mother who had grown up in a polygamist community and
experienced incest, sexual assault, forced marriage and other ongoing abuse as a child. She had
been labelled with a number of personality disorders, many of which focused on her obsessivecompulsive behaviour in parenting. The mother was described as overly-dependent on the
support of others and analogized to a child. The judge noted that “throughout this trial that she
often had her head resting upon a support person, or even her lawyer, much the way that a child
would rest her head upon a parent.”105 The mother was involved in a class-action lawsuit against
the Bountiful community and the judge was concerned that she may “fall back into her own
world with poor mental health and poor parenting” worrying that this lawsuit could lead to “the
possible waxing and waning of the mother’s mental health.”106
This tendency to infantilize mothers with disabilities is particularly acute for women with
intellectual disabilities. Not uncommonly, they are described as having the mental age of a child,
thus raising the spectre of a child raising a child, even though they are grown women with life
experiences that no child could possibly have.107 In one case where the children were removed in
part because of the mother’s “low intellectual functioning”,108 the court equated the candidness
of her testimony, presumably a good thing, with her being "quite childlike”.109 In TN, the mother
who had “significant cognitive and intellectual difficulties” was described variously as
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“emotionally immature” by the Ministry social worker, and presenting as “emotionally and
cognitively younger than her stated age” by the author of the parenting capacity assessment.110
Related to the childlike and dependent stereotype is the construction of the mother as
self-involved and incapable of placing her children’s needs before her own.111 The self-involved
mother can be contrasted with the ideal of the selfless mother who is expected to disregard her
own needs to meet those of her children, even at great cost to herself. Courts frequently describe
mothers with mental disabilities as being unable to place their children’s needs before their
own.112 For instance, in RM, where the mother had been raised and abused in a polygamist
community, the court stated:
All the children have obviously suffered significant neglect and emotional abuse as a
result of their mother being unable in the past to put her children's needs ahead of her
own personal needs.113
The inability to overcome addiction, to separate from an abusive partner, or to comply with the
plans made by mental health professionals are seen as a function of a mother being selfish.
Troubling assumptions about personal agency and choice are often at the heart of these
descriptors.
The cases reveal that mental disability is seen as permanent and often immutable. Yet
research indicates that parents with developmental disabilities can become skilled parents so long
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as support services are appropriately geared toward their needs. 114 Judges rarely connect the
labels of mental disability with the devastating social circumstances in which many of these
women find themselves.

In AM,115 the mother was a young woman with an intellectual

disability. Her child had been identified as having special needs such that “a highly competent
caregiver with considerable intellectual and emotional resources”116 would be required. One
expert described the results of the mother’s psychological testing as follows:
She displays herself as someone who is probably chronically unhappy,
pessimistic and resentful. The testing indicates someone who feels alienated
from the world, and has difficulty in meeting responsibilities. She is likely to be
insecure, but self-centred, demanding of attention, but at the same time
complaining about others not meeting her needs, being at fault for her
difficulties.117
The mother was described as functioning at a grade 3 level and much was made of her difficulty
with reading. There was no acknowledgement that she had almost certainly encountered
significant social barriers given her disability and that alienation and resentment are not
surprising for a woman in her circumstances. There was no evidence of any drug use, violence
or physical harm to the child. Despite the “many positive things” about her parenting, including
her patience with her child, she was simultaneously described as emotionally needy, immature
and narcissistic.118 The experts appeared to agree that this mother could learn additional
parenting skills but that the challenge would lie in generalizing those skills to new situations. An
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assisted parenting arrangement was considered not viable in this case. Instead a CCO was
granted and the mother was denied access because it might have made adoption more difficult.
Once a label gets attached to a woman it is very difficult for her to portray herself as a
competent mother. Where she struggles to overcome the challenges that led to the labels
initially, she may be construed as selfish and unwilling to put her child’s needs before her own.
Difficult circumstances such as being raised in an abusive, dysfunctional family or being raped
as a teenager may be dismissed as everyday “stressors” of life.119 There is little scrutiny on the
part of judges when a woman is presented as having multiple, sometimes contradictory, labels by
different experts. The social challenges these women face as a result in part of living with these
psychiatric labels are used as evidence to prove that the labels themselves are legitimate. As we
will see in the next section, these barriers are multiplied when the child is identified as having
“special needs”.
(iii) Children with Special Needs
The prevalence of children with “special needs” in Canada’s child protection systems has
been well documented.120 For example, the most recent Canadian Incidence Study on Child
Abuse and Neglect (2008) found that in 46 per cent of substantiated child maltreatment cases “at
least one child functioning issue was indicated.”121 As we noted earlier, a significant proportion
of CCO cases we reviewed (48 of the 85 cases (56%)) involved one or more of the children
being identified as having “special needs” of some kind. Numerous examples appear of the
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Director arguing that the special needs of the child warrant a CCO.122 Of course, considering the
specific needs of a child and the parent’s capacity to parent is not itself problematic. In assessing
a child’s best interests, courts are required to consider “the child's physical and emotional needs
and level of development”.123 However, the frequency with which the combination of the
mother’s mental disability and the child’s “special needs” is cited as a key reason for
permanently terminating their relationship underscores that despite the CFCSA’s disabilityneutral language, the child protection system continues to operate as a significant barrier to
women with mental disabilities, especially where their children are identified as having “special
needs”.
The past 20 years have seen a dramatic increase in children diagnosed with "special
needs” in Canada, especially those related to learning disabilities, attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder and/ or autism.124 While some applaud the trend towards the naming of new disorders,
more accurate and early diagnosis, development of new drugs, and innovative therapeutic
interventions in education and rehabilitation,125 others are more critical of the rising numbers.126
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How a child’s particular challenges factor into decisions about severing of the parental
relationship is revealing both in terms of what it says about motherhood and about disability.
While many scholars have shown the ubiquitous nature of mother blaming in relation to family
problems,127 there is a particular significance to blaming mothers in relation to child disability.
Importantly, the decisions link the child’s challenges to the mother, in a way that holds her
responsible. Sometimes a particular diagnosis is intrinsically linked to what the mother has or
has not done prenatally or after birth. Labels given to children such as reactive attachment
disorder,128 abstinence syndrome,129 and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder130 implicate mothers
directly. Mental health labels that are linked to affection, discipline or nurturing are inevitably
the mother’s fault. Yet it is not surprising that children are labelled as having attachment
disorders when many of them have been separated from their mothers from early infancy and
have interacted with their mothers only in supervised settings.131 Others have been in and out of
state care multiple times over their short lives. Yet none of their symptoms are attributed to the
actions of the state, only to those of the mother. Mothers are expected to be loving, selfless, and
totally concerned with their children both before and after birth so that any risks taken during
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pregnancy challenge the idea that she could be a good mother. 132 Where problems are traced to
the prenatal environment, the mother is always held responsible, regardless of what part the
father played in the culture of alcohol and drugs.
The lens of judicial discourse allows us to see not just that “special needs” children are
overrepresented, but also how the presence of the child’s “special needs” informs the arguments
made in favour of CCOs. In particular, the constructions of disability in the mother and child
intersect, often leading to the conclusion that mothers with mental disabilities are especially
unsuited to meet the needs of their children with “special needs”. We focus on two aspects of the
cases in which courts conclude that mothers lack the above-average level of skill required to
parent such children.
First, in some cases, the mother is told that, but for her child’s “special needs”, the child
would have been left in the mother’s care. In other words, the mother is not labelled as inherently
unfit to parent a child but only unfit to parent a child with “special needs”. In TR,133 for instance,
the mother was described as having “obvious deficits” and, while never tested, the court
speculated that she might share the same genetic condition as two of her children. The Director
acknowledged that she had “significantly improved” since the apprehensions of three other
children, but stated that she still did not “have a complete understanding of how the world
works” because she took her child on a “not at all well thought out” bus trip to the United
States.134 Significantly, the court expressly stated it would have given the mother another chance
but for the child’s special needs:
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This child is no longer a baby. If this child were of average or better
intelligence, it seems likely, for several reasons, that the Court would have given
her mother another chance to raise her daughter. First, this mother is not and
has not been violent or abusive to this child. The strongest case that the Director
could make in regard to abuse was that the mother was overly strict in enforcing
overly strict rules with this child. However, the Court finds no sufficient
evidence that the mother’s actions towards this child have, at any time in the last
many years, been sufficient to amount to grounds for permanent removal of this
child on the basis of actual abuse or neglect. Second, the mother can follow
directions. So long as she receives any help from our society whatsoever, she
would be able to make reasonable plans for ordering her daughter’s days and
would be able to follow through with them. Third, a child of average or better
intelligence would not need the extra support that a special or high needs child
would.
There are many more reasons why, at this point in time, at this point in this
mother’s life and development and at this point in the child’s life, that the Court
would be much more disposed to return the child to the mother’s care were it not
for the fact that this child is a high needs/special needs person.135
Not only did the court speculate that, had the child not had “special or high needs” the mother
could have retained custody, it also indicated that, if the existing foster parents were not able to
adopt the child, then the child should be returned to the mother’s care:
Notwithstanding anything else set out in these reasons for judgment, this Court
would return the child to the mother’s care if the Court understood that the
Director’s plan was to place the child for a stranger adoption; and adoption out
to yet another new set of parents in yet another home, probably in yet another
school.136
The judge realized that leaving the child with the mother would be a better option than a stranger
adoption, thus acknowledging that the mother was capable of parenting this child. Only because
there was a better offer on the table – dedicated foster parents willing to adopt – was the
relationship severed. The child’s disability gave the court permission to weigh competing homes
for the child to determine which one would be better. Further support surely should have been
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explored to see if the child’s exceptional needs could have been met with exceptional support.
Instead, a CCO was determined to be in the child’s best interest.137
Second, and often overlapping with the first concern, some decisions separate the child
with special needs, allowing the mother to retain custody of the “typical” children but not of the
child with “special needs”, thus isolating that child from his or her family connections. This
approach again suggests that the mother is a capable parent, but not an extraordinary parent who
can provide the additional care to meet the “special needs” of her child.
For example, in BG and VK,138 the Director sought a CCO for two toddlers. The Director
had “longstanding” concerns with the mother’s low intellectual functioning and the father’s
aggression and hostility.139 The older child is described as a “healthy two-year-old girl with little
in the way of special requirements” while the younger child “at 16 months is four to five months
globally delayed, with constipation problems and hypotonia”.140 With respect to the older child,
the court found that there was insufficient evidence that the parents would not be able to meet his
needs in a reasonable time. It concluded, however, that the parents would not be able to meet the
younger child’s special needs within the foreseeable future:
Before he was fed pureed food through some sort of a sucking apparatus. Now
his foster mother chops everything to the size of one-third of a grain of rice so
that he will not choke. It is obvious that D.K. will require continuous medical
care, as well as occupational therapy, physiotherapy and likely speech
therapy. The extraordinary effort taken by the foster parents just for feeding
make it clear that D.K. requires specialized care, a quality of care which is
simply beyond the capacity of his parents now and for the foreseeable future. In
this regard, I have considered the plan of care and the child's best interests, and
have no alternative but to make a continuing custody order for D.K.141
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As a result, a CCO was granted for this child, whereas only a temporary custody order was
granted with respect to the child without “special needs”. While efforts are often made to keep
siblings together, this goal was clearly not a priority in the decision.
MB highlights the dilemmas courts face when asked to separate siblings with “special
needs”. 142 In this case, a CCO was sought for eldest two children with “special needs” to remove
them from their Indigenous mother but not for the youngest child, an infant, who did not have
“special needs”. The court describes the mother as having a dysfunctional and abusive
upbringing, during which she spent time in foster care and had her first child at 14. She had
struggled with substance abuse and abusive relationships and was described as having borderline
intellectual functioning. The Director relied on an expert report emphasizing that the mother’s
“special needs” children required above-average parenting abilities that the mother lacked.
I think M.B. would not be capable of successfully dealing with the challenges
and stresses of raising three normal children. M.B. is almost certainly not
capable of parenting an infant as well as two children whose special needs
require greater than average parenting abilities. If M.B. were to parent her three
children, it is unlikely that she would be able to obtain enough support on an
ongoing basis over many years to prevent her from relapsing into destructive
modes of coping.143
However, the expert report indicated that she could adequately parent the infant child without
special needs, noting that she “has shown diligent efforts to improve herself, avoid substance
abuse, develop her parenting skills, and reach out for support.”144
At the time of the trial, the infant daughter continued to reside with the mother while the
older two daughters lived together in a foster placement with a non-Indigenous family that was
eager to adopt. The court described this placement in a way that highlighted the economic
advantage of the foster parents, with whom the children were “now very attached”:
142
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The foster home is wonderful-the kind of home any child would love to live in,
with a huge swimming pool and a back yard playground that would rival the
playground of many schools. The foster mother aggressively advocates for the
special needs of the children. The foster parents have gone so far as to pay out of
their own pocket for the oldest child to attend a private school to better address
her special needs. Both foster parents are actively involved in the parenting of
the children.145
The mother in this case had a strong network of support from her local aboriginal community,
which was concerned that she had not been given a fair opportunity to regain her two children at
least in part because she was Indigenous. The community believed that social workers had
already made their minds up to have the girls adopted by the foster family and thus did not take
unsupervised access seriously even though the mother had met their conditions for obtaining
such access. The judge was explicitly critical of the Ministry and recognized that the Ministry’s
behaviour was what led to a lack of cooperation on the part of the mother who felt that nothing
she did would be good enough to satisfy the Ministry.146
In the midst of the hearing, the court granted unsupervised access. Apparently during the
course of her testimony, the mother appeared to become more trusting. In stark contrast to the
suggestion that she had “limited cognitive abilities,”147 it became clear that “she could be very
articulate when she felt comfortable in her surroundings.”148 The court noted the
“metamorphosis” the mother had undergone and described her as an excellent parent for her
youngest child. Nonetheless a CCO was granted with respect to the eldest child, who had
expressed a desire to remain with the foster family. The court found that the relationship between
the daughter and the mother was so damaged that it would be like “being thrown back into the
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vortex of a tornado”149 to return her to the mother. This tornado had been caused at least in part
by the child protection system.
There were a number of positive aspects to this judgment. The court recognized the
enormous progress the mother had made, criticized the Ministry for failing to live up to its side
of the agreement, and refused to grant a CCO for the middle child. The judge also acknowledged
that judges should be cautious about using poverty as a basis for ordering a CSO:
Poverty brings with it a certain level of potential risk to children.
Unquestionably the mother needed to be taught that there were more proper
interim measures that could be taken to heat the trailer, such as getting a
temporary electric heater from the band. But this is all in the context of a mother
who was raised as a child in a tent in the bush where the only source of heat was
an open fire. The court must be careful not to overemphasise protection
concerns that are primarily rooted in poverty, otherwise a significant portion of
our population would be deemed to be in need of protection.150

Ultimately, however, the middle class benefits provided by the foster home loomed large in the
decision to terminate the mother’s relationship with her oldest daughter with special needs.
Foster families, especially those seeking to adopt, can create a conflict for a court. The
issue should not be whether a mother is the best option for a child but rather whether the
maternal relationship can, with support, be maintained for the child. Yet where the children have
been in foster care for some time, the deck may be stacked against the mother even if she has
made significant progress in putting her life together.151 The “best interests of a child” principle
should not provide a licence to look for the “best home” for a child.
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These cases are particularly striking in light of the fact that, as judges acknowledge,
children with extensive “special needs”, particularly older children, are difficult to place for
adoption and more likely to remain in foster care indefinitely.152 As a result of their “special
needs” these children do not just lose their mothers, but also potentially their siblings, their
grandparents and other extended family members. As we discuss later, these cases highlight the
critical role played by material supports. If a mother is fit to raise her “typical” children, it seems
likely that extensive support would allow her to care for a child with “special needs”. As we
suggest in our conclusion, judges should be given more power to require the state to provide
necessary supports. What makes it more difficult to parent a child with a disability is that more
resources, of all kinds, may be required. Families with significant economic resources are able
to purchase necessary services that support the particular needs of the child and provide
assistance to the parents. They are also likely to be more effective advocates for themselves and
their children and are not subjected to the sort of surveillance that poor families will be if they
receive publicly funded services. As a result, some parents are more likely to be able to maintain
their parent-child relationship than others, based largely on class.
In general, the additional “burdens” that come with parenting a “special needs" child in a
society not equipped to support that mother are expected to be borne by that mother alone. The
mother is held responsible for any limitations in her caregiving and only so much support is
available before a child will be removed. It is rarely acknowledged that the foster parent system
involves significant costs as well as significant risks.
(iv) Male violence against women
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Violence was prevalent in the lives of the women in our sample. As mentioned above,
over half of our cases involve male violence against women (46 of 85 or 54%).153 In 15 cases
(17%), men were either physically or sexually violent (or both) against children. Perhaps
surprisingly, there was not a great deal of overlap between male violence against women and that
against children, with only five cases involving both.154 All but one of these 15 cases (93%) led
to a CCO.155 There were allegations of violence committed by the mother in eight cases (9%), all
but one of which resulted in a CCO.156 Many of the mothers had also been victims of various
forms of violence as children. In this section, we focus on male violence against women because
of its prevalence in our study and because of the problematic aspects of removing children
because their mother is a victim of violence.157
Section 13(1)(c) of the CFCSA deals with what is sometimes called “failing to protect.” It
provides that a child is in need of protection if they have been, or are likely to be, “physically
harmed, sexually abused or sexually exploited by another person and if the child's parent is

153

This percentage is low given that not all cases involved a mother as a respondent. Some cases only involved a
father or a grandparent. Furthermore, in some cases, spousal abuse may not have been raised before the court or it
may not have been deemed relevant, particularly if the abuser was no longer in the picture or if the basis for the
application was something specific, like failure to seek adequate medical treatment for a child. Also this number
only refers to spousal abuse, not cases in which the mother may have been abused by non-spouses, such as other
family members. Numerous parents in this sample reported being abused emotionally, physically or sexually as
children or youths.
154
As noted above, there were 10 cases involving sexual violence and 10 cases involving physical violence against
children but with both physical and sexual violence in 5 cases, the total was 15 cases. There were only six cases
where violence was alleged to have been perpetrated against both the mother and the child. See Director v PS, supra
note 112; Director v BN and DW, supra note 67; Director v JH, supra note 76; Director v J, 2013 BCPC 68
[Director v J]; Director v CS and JK, supra note 122; Director v CB, supra note 67.
155
See Director v J, supra note 154.
156
See Director v RW, supra note 67; Director v SK, supra note 68; Director v JH, supra note 76; British Columbia
(Director of Family and Child Services) v HTHV, 2003 BCPC 376 [Director v HTHV]; The Director v CLA-V &
JFR, supra note 68; British Columbia (Director of Family and Child Services) v UW, 2005 BCPC 244; Director v
MD(1), supra note 76; Director v JY, supra note 122. In Director v HTHV, supra at para 27 for example, the mother
had been convicted of assaulting her daughters with a coat hanger although she continued to deny the allegations. It
was the denial, not the actual violence, that led the judge to conclude that she did not understand her duty to protect
her daughters and therefore to order a CCO.
157
See Catherine Richardson & Allan Wade, “Creating Islands of Safety: Contesting "Failure to Protect and Motherblaming in Child Protection Cases of Paternal Violence against Children and Mothers” in Susan Strega, et al, eds,
Failure to protect: Moving Beyond Gendered Responses to Violence (Winnipeg, MB: Fernwood Pub, 2013) 188.

unwilling or unable to protect the child.”158 The provision that deals most directly with children
witnessing spousal abuse provides that a child is in need of protection if he or she is
“emotionally harmed by living in a situation where there is domestic violence by or towards a
person with whom the child resides.”159 Our sample contains numerous cases of the Ministry
seeking a CCO at least partly on the basis of a woman “failing to protect” her children from
being exposed to the violence perpetrated against the mother by her male partner, but never did
the Ministry seek a CCO on the basis of a man failing to protect his children from violence
(either male or female).160
In many cases, the presence of male violence in the home was one of the primary
grounds on which the Director sought a CCO. The Director may also argue that a mother’s past
history of “choosing” abusive partners is indicative of a future risk of harm to the child, as if
choosing violent partners is something a woman does deliberately.161
Cases involving domestic violence are particularly challenging because in some of these
situations, the child may be at serious risk of harm and thus may need to be removed from the
home,162 at least temporarily, while supports are provided to the mother. The high number of
CCO’s in these cases demonstrate how seriously violence is taken by judges in the context of
child protection. We acknowledge that witnessing the abuse of their mothers is harmful for
158

See also section 13(1.2) which provides that for the purpose of s. 13(1)(c) the “the likelihood of physical harm to
a child increases when the child is living in a situation where there is domestic violence by or towards a person with
whom the child resides, CFCSA, supra note 17.”
159
CFCSA, supra note 17 at s 13(1)(e)(ii).
160
In one case, the Director did assert that the father had failed to protect the child from a mother with a serious
mental illness, but there were no allegations of violence: British Columbia (Director of Family and Child Services) v
JW, 2003 BCPC 155. The child was returned to the father under the Director's supervision for six months. One
condition of the order was that the child never be left alone with the mother.
161
This suggestion perpetuates the myth that battered women are masochistic and deliberately choose abusive men.
162
See, for example, Director v DW, supra note 76, where both the mother and her boyfriend were heavily involved
with the use and distribution of cocaine and where the mother had repeatedly been subjected to very significant
violence sometimes in the presence of her child. On one occasion the police responded after the mother had been
forcefully kidnapped by her boyfriend. While she testified she had given up cocaine, drug tests were repeatedly
positive for cocaine use. In DW, the child witnessed his mother being beaten and even shot at by her violent
boyfriend.

children, although we question whether permanent removal of the child is the only solution.
Two concerns arise from these cases. First, women are blamed for the violence against them as
if it is an immutable personality flaw that is determinative of their fitness to parent.163 Scholars
have written about the tendency to hold women responsible for failing to prevent violence
perpetrated against them in the context of domestic violence,164 sexual assault,165 and criminal
harassment166 and some cases reflect this view in the child protection context. Second,
inadequate attention is given to the connection between poverty and lack of housing, on the one
hand, and the inability to escape domestic violence on the other. A lack of housing options puts
women facing male violence in a particularly difficult dilemma. They are expected to leave their
violent partners to protect their children and yet may have no safe housing option.167 Removing
the child from the mother is seen as an easier solution than protecting the mother from violence.
Little concern is shown for the mother’s safety even though, in the majority of cases, she is the
sole target of the abuse. Nor is there a recognition that protecting the mother from violence also
protects the child from being exposed to it.
Removing children to protect them from witnessing abuse raises complex questions about
how responsibility for preventing violence against women should be allocated between the state,
society, and the individual. Other authors have demonstrated the ways in which the current
climate of neoliberal policy-making, particularly those policies concerned with “downloading”
163
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responsibilities from state to individual, disproportionately impact already marginalized
individuals and communities.168 In the child protection context, the burden of removing children
on the basis of witnessing domestic abuse falls heavily on women living in poverty, those who
are living with disability, and those who are Indigenous.
In a number of cases, the Director made return of children contingent upon a mother
leaving an abusive spouse and/or courts cited a mother’s failure to leave an abusive partner as a
ground for granting a CCO. For example, in BN and DW,169 the mother’s partner beat her in front
of her child and Ministry staff insisted that she leave the abuser to prevent the child from being
exposed to violence. The partner also violently spanked the child, leading to criminal charges. In
granting a CCO, the judge criticized the mother for maintaining contact with her partner even
after the child had been removed and for her “lack of attention to services available to reduce
risk to her and her children”.170 Yet the mother indicated that she stayed with the abuser because
she had “nowhere else to go.”171 In APM and KAB, 172 the Director cited “domestic violence” as
a key concern and pointed to the mother’s failure to follow through on attending a course “in
order to deal with the continuing violent relationships in which she has been engaged”. 173 The
Director’s concerns also included the mother’s “housing instability” as she had no fixed address
and was essentially homeless and living in shelters. However, the decision contains no
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suggestion that poverty or lack of housing might also explain the mother’s difficulty in leaving
her violent boyfriend.174
Women are at greatest risk of being assaulted and even killed by violent male partners
when they leave or attempt to leave a relationship.175 Thus, when the state requires a woman to
leave her relationship in order to maintain custody of her children, it is particularly important that
the state ensure her safety in doing so. In fact, police and other social support systems too often
fail to protect women and to provide necessary resources to make leaving a realistic option.176
Providing safe housing to a woman who is trying to escape violence should be an absolute
requirement on the part of the state before removing a child.177
The child protection system can create a Catch-22 for a woman who is deciding whether
to report violence against her. A mother who fears that her child may be removed from her care
is less likely to report the violence. This fear is not unfounded. A number of the child protection
investigations and removals in this study began with a report of domestic violence.178
Mental disability adds another dimension to the gendered dynamics of domestic violence
in child protection cases. Women with disabilities experience intimate partner violence at
174
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significantly higher rates than women without disabilities.179 Of the 39 cases involving mothers
identified in our sample as being victims of intimate partner violence, 36 of the mothers were
also identified as having either a history of addiction, a mental disability or both.180 Moreover,
not only do women with disabilities experience intimate partner violence at higher rates,181 but
they may experience intimate partner violence differently than women who do not have
disabilities,182 in part due to the unique barriers women with disabilities face in accessing support
and community resources when dealing with intimate partner violence. 183 Women with
disabilities may have difficulty in making contact with shelters or other services. They are more
likely to be financially dependent on their abusers and leaving a violent partner might involve
losing financial security and housing.184 They may also feel that they are more likely to be
disbelieved by the police and judges should they complain about the violence against them and
are unlikely to have a high level of trust that they will be protected from harm. Ironically,
women with mental disabilities are less likely to be believed in criminal courts as victims of male
179
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violence, yet those same claims of violence are often the basis for removing their children in the
child protection context.185
The prevalence of domestic violence in these cases is alarming and speaks powerfully to
the intersection of poverty, disability and gender. The failure of the criminal justice system to
respond adequately to male violence against women only aggravates the impact on women in the
child protection system who are seeking to retain custody of their children.186 So long as we
blame domestic violence on its victims, and fail to provide material supports like safe housing
for these women, it is likely that they will continue to lose their children. It is to this question of
support that we now turn.
(v) Failures of State Support

A central question about support services looms large in so many of these cases: to what
degree is the state responsible for providing the necessary supports that would enable mothers to
parent their children. We focus on two issues. First, what is the extent of the state obligation to
support mothers who are struggling to raise their children and second, what is the appropriate
response of the courts where women are not cooperative in accepting and following through with
Ministry supports? This latter question arises most often in the context of “soft supports” such as
parenting or other programs the Ministry believes could improve the mother’s parenting or
change her “lifestyle”.
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The CFCSA states as a Guiding Principle that “(c) if, with available support services, a
family can provide a safe and nurturing environment for a child, support services should be
provided”.187 As it stands, available support services presumably vary widely depending on
location in the province. While courts are clear that the state obligation to provide supports is
not unlimited, the extent of the state obligation remains unclear.
Judges often refer to the lack of support uncritically as if it is a fact of the mother’s life
and not a more systemic failure. In RM,188 the young Indigenous mother had an intellectual
disability. The judge described her situation as follows:
She is in a particularly difficult situation because she is of such limited
intellectual or social abilities, not meaning to be harsh to her, that employment is
a real difficulty for her. I cannot imagine, in a time when [sic] British Columbia
where unemployment rates are often in the ten percent range and where they are
in the sixty or seventy percent on most aboriginal reserves, that RM would ever
be able to obtain a job. Because she cannot meet the requirements for social
assistance, having not been away from her parents for two years, her financial
life is unimaginable. How R has managed to avoid the world of the homeless or
the drug addicted or life on East Hastings is a bit of a miracle. As I say, I cannot
imagine anyone employing her. If she survives the two years to social
assistance, she can only do it either by selling the virtues of a young woman or
being involved in serial relationships with others who can provide some of her
basic needs for at least shelter and food. The latter appears to be the case.189
Here the judge speculates that this young Indigenous mother with a disability may have to turn to
prostitution to support her child rather than demanding anything of the state in the way of
resources. Her relationships are described merely as a means of obtaining her basic needs for
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shelter and food. Aside from the obvious disrespect towards this mother in this passage, the
state’s responsibility for this woman’s dreadful circumstances is not acknowledged.
As we have described above, women are often blamed for unstable or lack of appropriate
housing or other resources, which are constructed as lifestyle choices rather than as a failure on
the part of the state.190 For example, in SG where stable housing was an issue, finding a home for
a family of five was acknowledged as a significant challenge:
As to the Director’s concern that these parents lack stable housing, this is of
some significance. From early on, the Director and the various social workers
involved in this case stressed the need on the part of his parents to establish a
stable residence appropriate for a family of five. … The parents achievement of
this goal of stable housing has been negatively affected by a number of factors,
including talk of living separate and apart, lack of income, perhaps the father’s
criminal background, probably a lack of supply of housing within their budget,
and I think based on all the evidence I have heard and reviewed, feeling on the
part of both parents of being overwhelmed by the demands of the whole process
of seeking reunification with their children.191
The case law suggests that there are limits on how much support can be provided to
facilitate a mother’s ability to care for her children. The decision in AJ, for example, cites an
earlier case indicating limits to state obligations to support women in their role as mothers:
Cases dealing with the mental capacity of a parent to properly look after his/her
child must be looked at individually. There are cases where, with proper
support, such a parent can adequately care for a child. Such support resources
are not infinite, but where reasonably possible they should be applied. If the
level of support resources required to properly meet the protection concerns of a
child becomes too high, then it cannot be said that the parent has the capacity to
meet the child's needs. The support services should not become the primary
caregiver for the child.192
At some point, then, the level of support needed will be seen as so significant that it undermines
the mother’s status as primary caregiver. The difficult question is how to determine what
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constitutes a “reasonable” level of support and at what point the needs of the mother for support
become so great that removing the child is seen as preferable to providing more support? The
notion that a certain level of support may render a parent no longer the “primary caregiver” has
concerning implications for persons with disabilities to be parents, particularly if they are poor.
What it means to be a parent is understood strictly in relation to a norm that does not include
disability, but rather one in which autonomy and independence from state support are understood
as hallmarks of “good” parenthood. For example, the fact that a woman who is quadriplegic may
need support with virtually all physical aspects of parenting does not, and should not, undermine
her role as mother and as primary caretaker. The question of how much is too much arises most
starkly in cases where a woman requires significant one-on-one support over a long period of
time in order to parent her child. When the support needs reach this level, judges are more likely
to order a CCO.
The individualistic focus on primary care could easily be extended to preclude the
appointment of a person to assist the parent, even when it may enable the parent to remain in the
child's life.193 Yet in the context of post-separation parenting, shared parenting of some sort is
generally preferred with the goal of keeping each parent involved with the child, even when one
parent has been less than fully committed to the child's care in the past.194 In the child protection
context, in contrast, even where there are potential shared parenting relationships within the
mother’s own family, they may be rejected by courts. For example, in MDC, both the paternal
grandparents and the maternal aunt were parties to the application seeking custody of the two
193
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children involved, although the grandparents only sought custody of the one child who was their
granddaughter. The expert witness was “satisfied that both parents are genuinely interested in
assuming responsibility” and noted that the parents would benefit from home care and regular
respite.195 However significant support would be required for the mother to raise her children:
Dr. Lea was very pointed and direct in his opinion that the mother was not
capable of parenting children on her own. He said that she would require the
assistance of an individual who would be dedicated to giving the next fourteen
to sixteen years to help the mother and to be prepared to do the heavy lifting in
parenting.196
In fact, the mother was already receiving help from friends and family with a number of tasks
and clearly her family was motivated to support her in parenting. However, in their testimony
the family members downplayed the amount of support the mother required, perhaps because
they believed that this would help her to retain custody. Although the aunt was willing to assist
her sister, the judge concluded that she did not have enough insight into her sister’s
“shortcomings and failures” as a parent197 and criticized her for wanting the mother to be the
primary caregiver.198 The judge was not willing to separate the girls and thus ruled out the
application by the grandparents even though there could be no guarantee that the children would
be kept together after a CCO. No consideration was given to the possibility of combining
resources amongst these various parties. Instead the Director’s plan to find adoptive parents for
the two children was accepted without scrutiny. In ordering that her relationship with her
children be permanently severed, the judge made the following comments:
I cannot help but have a level of sympathy for the mother. I recognize that in
her own mind the mother genuinely believes she can provide a good home for
these two young children. The mother needs to be commended for maintaining
her contact with Ms. McAllister and taking some steps to bring some stability to
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her life. I am also mindful that the visits with the children have generally been
positive and that Ms. M. clearly loves her children. However, there is clearly a
significant difference between caring for children during 1 to 2 hour a week
supervised access visits and parenting children on a full-time basis.199
The fact that the children were removed from her care at birth meant that the mother had never
had an opportunity to bond with the children nor to demonstrate whether she could, with support,
parent them. It was not her choice to only see her children on supervised access visits.
In several other cases, the idea of a full-time support worker was rejected out of hand. For
example, in BG and VK,200 the court referred to a psychologist’s report stating that the mother
would need a "responsible adult to ride shotgun over her parenting almost continuously".201 The
judge clearly believed that this requirement meant that a CCO was inevitably the appropriate
outcome. Similarly, in CDS,202 the court observed:
It is clear that she has periods where she functions better than at other times, but
even when she is functioning at what would appear to be her highest level, in my
view she is not functioning to a level which would permit her to parent even
with supports in place. She would effectively need a 24-hour-a-day co-parent in
order to raise a child.203
Some cases stress that the child requires “constant monitoring” and that the mother is not up to
that task. In LW and RW,204 for example, the court cited a foster parent’s evidence of what it
would take to adequately parent the special needs child:
In his evidence, J.B. outlined the factors which in his opinion would make
easier the return of the child with special needs. Those include a two-parent
family with one parent available at home; consistent supervision over the next 7
to 8 years; stability in the home; consistency; a nurturing environment to address
needs for instant gratification and the ability to provide consistent care 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week and not simply day care.205
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It is clear from this analysis that no single mother on her own could meet this child’s needs nor
could any parents without significant financial resources. This approach essentially suggests that
a stay-at-home mother family configuration was the only way this mother could maintain her
parental relationship.
Beyond the question of how much support is needed, the cases reveal considerable
concern on the part of judges with respect to the mother’s willingness to cooperate with those
providing support.206 The refusal to participate in multiple parenting programs was a consistent
theme and one that contributed significantly to decisions to remove children from their mothers.
In addition to courses in parenting, women were advised to attend courses for drug and alcohol
dependency, anger management, self-esteem workshops, or counseling for their choices of
friends or partners. If they did not comply with the advice, they were criticized regardless of the
actual connection to the parenting question. In KLR,207 for example, much of the Director’s case
in favour of the CCO was based on the mother’s failure to comply with the Director’s conditions.
The judge described the mother’s argument that this focus was inappropriate:
Counsel for the Respondent stresses that it is the child’s interest that needs to be
considered first, not meeting the dictates of a powerful state agency. He notes
that much of the case for the Director focused on how the Respondent did not
comply with the demands made on her by the Director, and that is not what the
CFCSA asks the court to consider in making a decision of this nature. He is
critical of the Director’s position of “three strikes, you’re out” and of how the
Director has ceased any measure that would assist in reuniting the children with
the Respondent. He argues that the present reality is that the Respondent is
ready, willing and able to parent these children despite her past and despite the
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fact that she has not done things according to how the Director would have
liked.208
The children were returned to the mother because she had overcome her addiction, was gainfully
employed and in a stable relationship.209
Where mothers have complied with treatment programs, but make mistakes subsequently,
a conclusion is drawn that they have not tried hard enough or failed to adequately retain enough
information. It is important to consider in assessing a mother’s refusal to participate in
programs, whether they are appropriate for her particular circumstances. In RM,210 for example,
a case involving a young Indigenous mother with an intellectual disability, the judge described
the inevitable failure of the mother in a particular program:
She goes into Second Stage, a housing project for young mothers who are
having trouble parenting, and it is a loving and supporting environment. It is
strict. It has rules and particularly for a young, possibly an FAE/FAS aboriginal,
it must have been a fairly complex structure for her to cope with. She herself
describes her upbringing as pretty chaotic so the mere transition to Second
Stage, even though well-intentioned, I think probably was doomed to failure.
There, at Second Stage, within a period of a couple of weeks, RM simply
horrified everybody who came into contact with her. Her parenting skills were
very, very minimal.211
This statement surely begs the question of why this mother was put into a program where failure
was apparently inevitable. The young mother in this case was also bounced from one social
worker to another. In the words of the judge “every time [she goes] to see the Director, it is a
different face.”212 The judge stressed that the mother was not hurting her child nor exposing her
child to violence but rather was someone who needed significant supports to parent. The judge
acknowledged that the concept of assisted or shared parenting might have been plausible for her:
208
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In an ideal world, it is a shame that R. and her child could not be placed together
in the home of, say, a fifty-year-old Nisga grandmother of strong character and
who, with the power of a matrilineal society, would be able to simultaneously
raise them together so that R. would be able to have those bonds of ties and
affection with her child, yet her special needs could be met while the child could
be raised in safety and security213
This privatization of the responsibility to provide adequate supports meant that because no
family member was available, a CCO was granted to the Director. No expectation was made that
the Director should support or help develop a shared parenting agreement.
In TN, a case involving a 21-year-old Indigenous mother,214 the Director sought a CCO
for a two-year old child, citing “the mother's limited intellect, her chaotic lifestyle, her lack of
family support and her inability to absorb and benefit from the numerous programs and help that
have been made available to her”.215 Much of the evaluation of the mother was based on her
lack of enthusiasm for, and irregular attendance at, parenting programs. She was repeatedly
criticized for spending time focusing on her own daily crises as opposed to the goals of the
parenting program.
The mother in this case may well have struggled to be the sole caretaker of the child in
question but no other options were explored. She had a significant intellectual disability and was
sent to multiple parenting programs, shuffled among multiple social workers, and criticized for
paying attention to the (not insignificant) problems in her own life. Despite the extensive
involvement of social services in her life, there is little evidence that material supports were
provided, such as help within the home, stable housing and so on. One of the parental capacity
assessments concluded that the mother was able to parent and nurture her son and focused on the
progress that she had made in overcoming an abusive childhood and in remaining clean and

213

Ibid at para 16.
Director v TN, supra note 76.
215
Ibid at para 40.
214

sober. As the court describes, this assessor was critical of how the Ministry had interacted with
the mother:
The ministry’s approach to Ms. T.N. failed to appreciate her limiting deficits
and an inherent aboriginal distrust of the child protection authorities. Dr. Howes
felt that there are too many social workers and that too much information was
given to Ms. T.N. She said that expectations were unrealistic. She was of the
view that existing aboriginal agencies would assist T.N. and that these agencies
would be the best source of ongoing support for her.216
The judge also noted that the mother had connected to her aboriginal culture and that the
aboriginal community agencies were available to help her parent. Nonetheless, another maternal
capacity report was accepted over this more encouraging one and the judge concluded that the
mother was unable to care for her child. While some of the parenting programs were apparently
culturally appropriate, no mention was made of whether they were appropriate for a mother with
a significant intellectual disability. Instead, the mother was held solely responsible for her failure
to comprehend and retain what was being taught.217
Nor are judges rigorous about requiring evidence that such programs have a high
“success” rate in terms of helping people escape violence, drug addiction and poverty. Rather, it
is assumed that these programs work and that parents who fail to cooperate are correspondingly
unfit to parent.218 In the context of domestic violence, it is assumed that male violence can be
dealt with simply by teaching women not to choose abusive men. In BP,219 a CCO was granted
on the basis that the mother had made bad “choices” about men, and she used marijuana. It was
important to the judge that she would not go to counselling to deal with her problem in choosing
inappropriate partners:
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Although she is without a partner at present and says she won't let someone else
control her life that way again, she has done nothing to change what was in her
to pick out such a partner and to stick with him. This refers, of course, to the
lack of long term counselling.220
The cases reveal little evidence of judges questioning the validity of a program or treatment
generally or the reasons to expect it to be successful in the particular case. Nor do judges
interrogate whether a particular program was well-suited for the woman in question given either
her level of intellectual functioning or other disability and her culture.
Women who do not accept help from treatment programs thus fare poorly in the child
protection system. As we have seen, distrust by many of the women in our sample of soft
supports, such as parenting courses or counselling, often results in mothers rejecting offers by the
state of this type of assistance. This distrust and lack of participation in turn can result in women
being labelled uncooperative, which may lead to negative inferences being drawn about their
capacity to parent. The final trigger for the CCO application may be something that is not
inherently harmful to the child but rather something that demonstrates the mother’s lack of
cooperation with the Ministry, such as leaving the jurisdiction with the child.221
Implicit in these decisions is the suggestion that any conscientious parent would agree to
participate in whatever programs the Ministry recommends. Yet these refusals must be seen in
the context of the lives of women who have been subject to high levels of state surveillance and
intervention, and repeated judgments about their various inadequacies, especially as mothers.
Requests for support may in fact be what triggered past child apprehensions. Many mothers
understandably see the Ministry and related “helping professionals” with skepticism and distrust.
Given that the Ministry may have removed a woman's children multiple times and, in many
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cases, removed the woman herself from her own mother, it is not surprising that social workers
may be seen not as a source of support but rather as a potential threat. This suspicion may be
particularly apt for Indigenous women given the long history of state intervention and dislocation
of Indigenous children at the hands of child protection authorities.222

Conclusions
Several trends in the case law are particularly troubling. First, child protection law is not
supposed to be interpreted in a way that compares a child’s actual family situation to that of
another family that may be superior due, for instance, to more economic resources.223 If this
approach prevailed, children with disabilities could often be removed from the care of poor,
single women and given to families with greater economic resources. As one judge noted, “if it
were a competition between the foster mother, and the biological mother… rarely would we
return the children [to their mother].”224 Instead, a child is only supposed to be removed because
of a parent’s absence or harm (or risk of harm) to a child or inability or unwillingness to care for
the child.225 In practice, however, comparisons seem to occur, for example, to what a foster
parent can offer. In cases involving children who have been identified as “special needs”, in
particular, comparison to more affluent parents and their capacity for “extraordinary” parenting
may be explicit. A child should be placed with his or her parent if that is a safe option even
though there may be a family better equipped to care for the particular child. For instance, the
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court in TR was willing to concede that care by the mother was better than a stranger adoption:
“If our society is not prepared to maintain the current very high level foster placement, then this
Court is convinced that the mother should be given one last chance” and willing to acknowledge
the tremendous gains the mother had made in pulling her life together.226 Yet because an existing
foster family was prepared to adopt, the child was not returned to the mother.
Second, there appears to be an unspoken assumption that children who are apprehended
by the state will end up in “better” circumstances than those from which they were removed.
The overwhelming majority of these cases do not mention the risks of children in care being
shuttled from one foster home to another, living alone in hotels or children dealing with the
trauma of losing a parent and possibly their extended family. Nor is the potential for abuse,
sexual violence and neglect in state care mentioned. The idea that children will necessarily thrive
if taken from their mothers is simply false.227 The fact that almost 1/3 of the mothers in our study
had themselves been in state care as children demonstrates the intergenerational impact of the
child protection system on families. Third, and related to the second, judges do not require a
high degree of specificity about the plan for the child’s future after the CCO is ordered. The
cases contain vague statements like the Director “hopes” to keep multiple children together in the
adoption process, but rarely is there any certainty that the children will be placed in a permanent
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British Columbia's Child Advocate, Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, provided the following statistics about children
in the care of the Ministry in a recent interview: "More than 2,000 children were critically injured between July 2007
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while in foster care which included permanent brain damage and permanent visual impairment requiring around-theclock care. Very few details were given other than to say criminal proceedings were underway. Director v GM,
supra note 56. The judge ordered that the child not be placed for adoption so that the mother could have ongoing
access to the child in foster care.

home or that siblings will be kept together.228 Particularly given the high number of children with
“special needs", and the difficulty in placing such children for adoption, many will remain in the
foster care system until they age out.
Finally, perhaps the most dominant theme in these cases is that women are blamed and
found responsible for the desperate social circumstances in which they find themselves, often
related to poverty, mental disability/addiction, homelessness, male violence, the
intergenerational impact of the child protection system and the tragic legacy of residential
schools and the removal of Indigenous children from their families.229 A pervasive and longstanding ideology that blames mothers for anything that is seen as wrong with their children
influences judicial decision-making in various legal fields.230 Marlee Kline also argued that this
individualized approach to responsibility means that child protection workers are trained to find
solutions for a mother’s problematic activity rather than to “develop responses to problems of
poverty, racism, and violence, and the way these affect women’s lives.”231 Mothers in the CCO
decisions that we studied are expected to always put their children’s interests above their own,
while at the same time they are expected to work hard to improve their own, often dismal,
circumstances. This standard is particularly difficult to meet for women who are struggling with
poverty, mental disability/addiction, and male violence, as so many mothers in our study were.
By the time mothers arrive at this final stage of the child protection process, their parental status
has already been seriously undermined through previous apprehensions, court orders, and reports
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that criticize their parenting. They may be blamed for not bonding with their children despite the
fact that they may have rarely, and sometimes never, had custody of those children or have only
spent time with them under strict supervision in very limited settings. They are also blamed for
failure to cooperate with the very Ministry that is attempting to remove their children.
In her 1995 article, Professor Mosoff recommended, quite modestly, “simply that judges
act as they do on other matters and scrutinize the evidence of experts in child welfare cases with
the same rigour as they would in other proceedings.”232 We would also suggest that more
attention needs to be paid to the possibility of support systems that might allow more mothers to
be parents to their children.233 A mother’s relationship to her child should only be severed when
remaining with her is an utterly unacceptable option; not where remaining with the mother is
simply not the best option. Safe and affordable housing may allow women to escape from violent
relationships. Child care and adequate respite for single mothers can be key, as well as advocacy
in facilitating access to various social support systems. Where possible, some form of shared
parenting between a mother and a relative or foster parent can also be a positive strategy.234
Leaving a child with his or her parent may sometimes involve a certain amount of risk in
the sense that one cannot be certain that a parent will be able to rise to the occasion. We believe
that, in calculating that risk, and in assessing whether it is too great to warrant leaving the child
with the mother, the risks that are involved in removing children from their parents must also be
weighed in the balance. Instead of a one-sided calculation, where only one type of risk is
examined by the courts, judges need to demand more evidence that the risks of apprehension will
not harm the child. As one judge astutely noted, “the best of foster care is not always better than
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a sub-par home with a natural parent.”235 Acknowledging the risks to children that can
accompany CCOs, and the devastating intergenerational effects of the child protection system on
families, might lead policy makers to be more willing to go further with respect to material and
other supports to keep families together. By examining risks, we do not mean comparing the
advantages of another family over that of the mother, but rather avoiding the assumption that the
child will end up in a safe environment if removed from the mother.
Overall, our findings support the recommendations of others236 that better child
protection practices and outcomes cannot be accomplished simply through legislative changes,
but also require the resolution of social problems that have been named many times: addressing
women’s and children’s poverty; providing necessary services for survivors of abuse and people
with disabilities; dealing with Aboriginal claims for self-determination. We also urge that courts
be given more power under the CFCSA to order that additional services be provided to support
parents. A judge should not be permitted to order a CCO until he or she is confident that all
support options have been exhausted. Recognizing the difficult decisions that must often be
made in these cases, we would urge that judges do whatever remains in their power to ensure
that, where possible, children remain in the care of their mothers.
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